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O
ne of the pillars of rural development in francophone
Africa, the cotton sector serves as a principal motor of
economic development, generating benefits to farmers, rural
communities, private traders, cotton companies, and national
governments.Grown in rotation with coarse grains under rainfed
conditions, the cotton sector in Mali has historically been
managed by vertically integrated, state-supported cotton
companies.With a guaranteed price and market for seed cotton,
access to inputs and equipment on credit,and improved varieties
developed by the cotton-supported regional research system,
cotton households have traditionally been the most prosperous
in rural Mali. Currently 30 percent of Malian households
cultivate cotton.Their cotton profits have enabled them to
build up their agricultural assets, particularly oxen and plows,
making them likewise the nation’s most productive cereal
producers.Cotton is Mali’s number two export and foreign
exchange earner (after gold),and it contributes 15 percent of
total government revenues and 8 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP). Government and farmers alike consider cotton
a strategic industry.
IMPACT
• Production. Cotton production has grown at a compound
annual growth rate of more than 9 percent for the past 40
years (Figure 1). Currently, 30 percent of Mali’s households
grow cotton.
• Equity. Most smallholders in Mali’s cotton zones 
(Figure 2) grow cotton.They earn higher incomes and invest
more in agriculture than smallholders in other zones.These
additional resources enable cotton farmers to produce up to
70 percent more cereals per capita than non–cotton farmers.
• Sustainability.The vertically integrated, state-owned
CMDT (Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des
Fibres Textiles) that supports Malian cotton farmers has
attempted to stabilize farmer prices and,to some extent,
insulate them from world price fluctuations.In recent years the
CMDT has provided a recurrent subsidy of about US$0.025 per
pound (6 percent of world price),far lower than the US$0.235
per pound subsidy received by U.S.cotton farmers.Difficulties
encountered in maintaining corporate governance and control-
ling cost inflation over the past five years have contributed to an
erosion of farmers’ confidence in the CMDT as well as the
overall competitiveness of cotton production in Mali.These
problems have contributed to debate over the most effective
type of institutional structures needed to achieve sector objec-
tives.Environmentally,questions also have arisen about soil
fertility management and possible soil mining in some locations.
The growing resistance to pesticides and need for more concen-
trated,costlier formulations to reverse declining yield trends will
need to be balanced with the growing concerns over their
negative effects on human health.
DRIVERS OF CHANGE 
• Vertically integrated support for smallholders.The CMDT
supplies inputs, extension support, and a guaranteed market for
smallholder cotton production in Mali.The integrated approach
used across the CFA franc zone begins with a regional varietal
breeding and agronomic research program that links Mali’s
Rural Economy Institute in a network of CFA franc zone
countries harmonized by France’s Centre de coopération
internationale en recherche agronomique pour de développe-
ment (CIRAD). In addition to supplying inputs (seeds, fertilizer,
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Figure 1—Cotton area and production: 1960–2003
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and pesticides) on credit and facilitating the acquisition of
animal traction equipment, the CMDT uses an extensive
network of field agents to closely monitor all phases of
production.A monopolist, the CMDT guarantees the purchase
of farmers’ seed cotton at panterritorial prices (announced
before planting) and assures credit reimbursement. It controls
collection, ginning, baling, and export.
• Devaluation. During the early 1990s,throughout West
Africa’s CFA franc zone,the guaranteed exchange rate pegged to
the French franc led to steady overvaluation of the CFA franc
and consequent erosion of farmgate cotton prices.The devalua-
tion of 1994 led to a 40 percent increase in real farmgate prices,
a doubling of area planted,and a subsequent twofold rise in seed
cotton production over the next five years,returning production
to its historic upward trend (Figure 1).
KEY LESSONS FOR BUILDING FUTURE SUCCESSES 
• Vertical models of smallholder support.The Malian cotton
model exemplifies the common vertical support system for
smallholder agriculture,in which a single entity supplies inputs
(usually on credit) in return for guaranteed marketing of the
output,from which input costs can be deducted.Though histori-
cally a public sector model in Mali,private companies elsewhere
have adopted the same outgrower systems for cotton and other
export crops.Questions about the inefficiency and high cost of
Mali’s public sector model have led to recent,highly contentious
debates about possible privatization of the system in Mali and
elsewhere in francophone Africa.The vertical model offers one
of the very few available for providing sustainable input credits
to smallholders.It addresses the issues of aggregation and organ-
ization,thereby helping smallholders gain access to international
markets.Yet the model fails in the case of domestic foodcrops,
and it depends critically on some form of farmer organization,
competition among buyers,or countervailing political power to
ensure that farmers get fair treatment from large exporters.
• Farmer organization.The rise of the cotton producers’
union (Syndicat des Producteurs de Coton et Vivriers, SYCOV)
has helped to broker fairer negotiations between farmers and
the CMDT, providing small farmers with a collective means of
expressing their views. In 1974 the CMDT established
Associations Villageoises (AV)—village-based farmer organiza-
tions—to deal with farmer complaints of unfair cotton grading
and weighing practices. Growing farmer involvement in
managing village-level cotton activities (inputs, seed cotton
assembly) laid the groundwork for greater farmer participation
in the operational management of the sector (such as farmer
representatives being signatory to performance contracts with
the government and CMDT).These experiences, combined with
the opportunities created by the grassroots democracy wave in
the early 1990s, contributed to the creation of the farmer’s
union (SYCOV) in 1991.
• Farm subsidies in countries of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Heavy
subsidies to cotton farmers in the United States currently
depress world prices by about US$0.11 per pound.If these
subsidies were removed and the price increase transmitted to
Malian farmers,the typical farm would increase earnings by 30
percent.In this case,trade reform by the OECD would prove
more powerful than aid in improving African farmer welfare.But
without the additional investment and institutional evolution that
lead to improvement in productivity at all stages of the supply
chain,Malian cotton will continue to be vulnerable to competi-
tive pressures and world market price fluctuations.
• Soil fertility management.Over the past 40 years,two-
thirds of Mali’s cotton production growth has come from area
expansion and the remaining one-third from increasing yield.The
past pattern of extensification,in which farmers reduce fallow
periods and apply insufficient quantities of organic fertilizers,has
contributed to declining soil fertility.As area expansion becomes
increasingly infeasible,in Mali as elsewhere in Africa,increasing
attention will need to be devoted to maintaining soil fertility.
• Benefits of regional collaboration.In both research and
marketing,Mali has benefited from collaboration with regional
cotton networks that have achieved important scale economies
for many small countries in the region.In cotton breeding,Mali’s
national agricultural research program at the Institut d’Economie
Rurale (IER) is linked to a regional network of other West and
Central African breeding programs managed by CIRAD that
facilitates cross-country exchange of new varieties.In fact,only
one of the six major cotton varieties grown in Mali during the
past 40 years was originally developed by Mali’s national
research system.In marketing as well,the CMDT benefits from
regional cooperation through its continued close association
with Dagris,formerly known as the Compagnie Française de
Développement des Textiles (CFDT),which managed Mali’s
cotton sector until 1974 and still retains 40 percent ownership
in the CMDT.Dagris not only provides technical expertise for
the Malian ginning operations,but also markets the bulk of Mali’s
cotton through its marketing arm,COPACO.CMDT can thus
develop a market identity for Malian cotton while at the same
time benefiting from economies of scale that would not
otherwise be possible for a single small country. Given obvious
spillovers of agroclimatic zones across contiguous African
countries,this model of regional collaboration in research and
marketing illustrates key benefits that could be applied to many
other agricultural commodities—bananas,cassava,maize,beans,
and livestock,for example.  
For further reading see J. Bingen,“Prospects for
Development and Democracy in West Africa:Agrarian
Politics in Mali,” in Democracy and Development in Mali,
edited by J. Bingen, D. Robinson, and J. M. Staatz (East
Lansing, MI, USA: Michigan State University Press, 2000); J.
Tefft,“Mali’s White Revolution: Smallholder Cotton from
1960 to 2003,” Background Paper No. 4 for the conference
“Successes in African Agriculture: Building for the Future,”
Pretoria, South Africa, December 1–3, 2003.
International Food Policy Research Institute
2033 K Street, N.W. •  Washington, D.C. 20006-1002  •  U.S.A.
Phone: +1-202-862-5600  •  Fax: +1-202-467-4439  •  Email: ifpri@cgiar.org
www.ifpri.org
Copyright © 2004 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights  reserved. Contact ifpri-copyright@cgiar.org to request permission to reprint.